Triadic political opportunity structures: Re-conceptualising immigrant transnational politics

Ali R Chaudhary and Dana M Moss
The IMI Working Papers Series

The International Migration Institute (IMI) has been publishing working papers since its foundation in 2006. The series presents current research in the field of international migration. The papers in this series:

- analyse migration as part of broader global change
- contribute to new theoretical approaches
- advance understanding of the multi-level forces driving migration

Abstract

Immigrants increasingly engage in homeland-oriented transnational institutional and non-institutional collective political action. Immigrant transnational political action, in turn, is largely conceptualised as being determined by either contexts of reception in receiving societies or diaspora policies emanating from immigrant origin countries. Thus, existing literature largely views immigrants’ transnational political action as a product of one particular political context or policy, which neglects to account for the ways in which their transnational politics are simultaneously embedded in and shaped by multiple political contexts. In this paper, we develop a nuanced account of the distinctive ways in which multiple political contexts shape the cross-border electoral, organisational and non-institutional collective action of immigrants and diaspora communities. By doing so, we transcend analytical emphases on receiving-society effects which largely view homeland-oriented politics through the lens of immigrant incorporation. We propose a triadic political opportunity approach to conceptualise how varied receiving-country, origin-country, and transnational political contexts shape immigrant transnational political action. We illustrate the utility of this approach by drawing on original research and secondary sources to demonstrate how receiving, origin and transnational political opportunity structures can facilitate and/or constrain immigrant transnational political action. We conclude with a discussion of potential applications of our approach for future research.

Keywords: Transnational political action, political opportunity structure, electoral politics, organisational, non-institutional collective action

Authors: Ali R. Chaudhary, Marie Curie Postdoctoral Fellow, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, ali.chaudhary@qeh.ox.ac.uk; Dana M. Moss, PhD candidate, Department of Sociology, University of California, Irvine.

Acknowledgements and comments: This research has been funded and supported by a Marie Curie Early Career Postdoctoral Fellowship awarded to Dr. Ali R. Chaudhary in association with the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme Marie Curie Action Initial Training Networks (ITN) ‘Transnational Migration, Citizenship and the Circulation of Rights and Responsibilities TRANSMIC’. The original empirical data presented in this paper were previously supported and funded by the University of California Center for New Racial Studies, the University of California Office of the President, the US National Science Foundation, the UC Irvine Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies, the American Institute of Yemeni Studies, the Departments of Sociology and Human Ecology at UC Davis and the Department of Sociology at UC Irvine. The authors would like to thank Dr. Marie Godin for providing useful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Contents

The IMI Working Papers Series .................................................................................. 2

Abstract ......................................................................................................................... 2

1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 4

2 Immigrant transnational political action ................................................................. 5
   2.1 Receiving-country approach .................................................................................. 5
   2.2 Origin country approach ....................................................................................... 5
   2.3 Transnational approach ....................................................................................... 6

3 Three types of immigrant TPA .................................................................................. 6

4 A triadic political opportunity structure approach to TPA ..................................... 7
   4.1 Receiving-country POS ....................................................................................... 8
   4.2 Origin-country POS .............................................................................................. 9
   4.3 Transnational POS .............................................................................................. 10

5 Applying the triadic POS approach to immigrant TPA ........................................... 11

6 How the receiving POS affects immigrant TPA ....................................................... 11
   6.1 Receiving POS and electoral TPA .......................................................................... 11
   6.2 Receiving POS and organisational TPA ............................................................... 12
   6.3 Receiving POS and non-institutional TPA ............................................................ 13

7 How the origin-country POS affects immigrant TPA .............................................. 13
   7.1 Origin POS and electoral TPA ............................................................................... 13
   7.2 Origin POS and organisational TPA ..................................................................... 15
   7.3 Origin POS and non-institutional TPA ................................................................. 16

8 How the transnational POS affects TPA ................................................................. 17
   8.1 Transnational POS and electoral TPA ................................................................. 17
   8.2 Transnational POS and organisational TPA ........................................................ 18
   8.3 Transnational POS and non-institutional TPA ...................................................... 19

9 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 20
   9.1 Limitations ........................................................................................................... 21
   9.2 Directions for future research .............................................................................. 21

10 References ............................................................................................................... 23
1 Introduction

Recent decades have witnessed increasing academic and public interest in the ways in which immigrants and diaspora groups engage in homeland politics from afar. Immigrants’ countries of origin and the receiving societies to which they arrive may undergo dramatic social, economic and political transformations as a result of large-scale migration and sustained transnational links between immigrants’ places of origin and settlement (Castles et al. 2013). Consequently, social scientists increasingly investigate how immigrants maintain a variety of transnational ties to their origin countries while living and integrating into their new places of settlement (Faist 1998; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Portes and Fernandez-Kelly 2015; Schiller et al. 1992; Vertovec 1999; Waldinger 2015). Homeland-oriented political engagement from abroad represents a central topic of inquiry in a growing literature on immigrant transnationalism (Bauber 2003; Boccagni et al. 2015; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Itzigsohn 2000; Lyons and Mandaville 2012; Waldinger and Soehl 2013). However, existing theoretical approaches in much of the previous scholarship suffer from two notable limitations.

First, despite calls for exploring the simultaneity of immigrant transnational practices (Levitt and Schiller 2004), previous research largely analyses immigrant transnational political engagement through the lens of immigrant integration – limiting the analytic focus to the effects of the receiving society on immigrants’ cross-border political participation (Guarnizo et al. 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001; Waldinger 2008; Waldinger and Soehl 2013). While integration policies and immigrants’ socioeconomic incorporation certainly shape their transnational practices in important ways, existing discussions of integration and receiving-country effects conceal the extent to which origin-country and transnational contexts impact immigrant transnational politics. Second, with few exceptions, previous scholarship tends to emphasise electoral politics rather than other forms of politically motivated collective action. Consequently, we know very little about how receiving, origin and transnational political contexts affect immigrants’ proclivities to engage in non-electoral transnational politics such as transnational political organisations or homeland-oriented non-institutional collective action as in the case of protest and demonstrations. We transcend this narrow focus on electoral politics by offering a more robust conceptualisation of immigrant transnational political action (TPA), recognising that immigrants may participate in electoral, organisational and non-institutional collective action directed towards their countries or places of origin and that the repertoire of TPA can vary across time and place.

In this paper, we build upon the growing scholarship on transnational politics by offering a new theoretical approach for investigating how immigrant TPA is embedded in multiple political opportunity contexts – entailing a wide spectrum of institutional and non-institutional types of political action. Drawing on social movement scholarship within sociology and political science (McAdam et al. 1996a; Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Tilly and Tarrow 2015) and building on new scholarship that applies social movement theory to diaspora politics (Adamson 2012, 2013; Koinova 2013; Sökefeld 2006), we propose a triadic political opportunity approach to account for the ways in which electoral, organisational and non-institutional immigrant TPAs are embedded and shaped by receiving-country, origin-country and transnational political contexts. In the following, we briefly review existing scholarship on immigrant TPA before introducing our triadic political opportunity approach. We then use examples from original research and secondary sources to elucidate how receiving, origin and transnational political opportunity structures (POSs) can both facilitate and constrain immigrants’ electoral, organisational and non-institutional TPA. We conclude by arguing that researchers need to

---

1 It should be noted that Guarnizo et al. (2003) specifically examine the non-electoral transnational political activities of Latin American migrants in the US.
account for the ways in which each of the three POSs can affect immigrant TPA across time and place and strive towards complex analyses of TPA that can analyse and account for the simultaneous effects of triadic POSs.

2 Immigrant transnational political action

2.1 Receiving-country approach

A growing body of scholarship examines how immigrant communities transnationally engage in the politics of their homelands (Adamson 2013, 2005; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Collyer 2014; Koinova 2013; Lyons and Mandaville 2012; Waldinger 2015). Sociological scholarship largely examines the relationship between immigrant integration and transnational political engagement (Chaudhary 2016; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Itzigsohn 2000; Waldinger and Soehl 2013). In so doing, this scholarship analyses the ways in which socioeconomic integration and contexts of reception in receiving societies facilitate or constrain immigrants’ transnational political engagement. For instance, in their seminal study of Latin American immigrant assimilation and transnational political engagement, Guarnizo et al. (2003), find that successful socioeconomic integration and a favorable context of reception increase immigrants’ proclivities to engage in transnational politics. Alternatively, previous studies also find a negative relationship between immigrant integration, favourable contexts of reception and transnational political engagement. Waldinger and colleagues find the prevalence of transnational political engagement is over-estimated and that electoral transnational political engagement decreases over time as immigrants re-socialise into the socioeconomic and political cultures of their new host societies (Soehl and Waldinger 2010; Waldinger 2015; Waldinger and Soehl 2013; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004).

Turning to contexts in the receiving society, Koopmans and Statham (2003) find higher levels of homeland oriented political ‘claims-making’ in Germany when compared to the Netherlands or Britain. That is, transnational claims-making is more likely in the less inclusive German POS, where immigrants are classified as foreigners compared to the Dutch or British POS where immigrants confront less restrictive POSs that encourage integration. Despite these contradictory findings, previous research on transnational political engagement shares a common emphasis on receiving country contexts of reception. While making important strides in our understandings of transnational social processes, this has led to an incomplete account of the ways in which immigrant TPA is simultaneously embedded in and shaped by multiple political contexts.

2.2 Origin country approach

A small but expanding body of scholarship examines TPA with an emphasis on diaspora engagement efforts undertaken by immigrant countries of origin. Research on diaspora engagement and the rise of extraterritorial citizenship documents the ways in which immigrant origin-countries increasingly seek to cultivate, engage and integrate their emigrants and diasporas into the homeland political culture (Agarwala 2015; Collyer 2013; Gamlen 2008; Naujoks 2013). Diaspora engagement policies implemented by immigrant origin countries increasingly grant dual-citizenship as well as external voting rights to non-residents living abroad (Adamson and Demetriou 2007; Bauböck 2003; Collyer 2013; Délano and Gamlen 2014; Lafleur 2013). In some cases, origin countries may even create particular elected political offices for emigrants abroad or government branches dedicated to diaspora cultivation and integration (Collyer 2014; Itzigsohn 2000; Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008; Levitt 2001). Thus, the extent to which an origin county engages with its diaspora may influence whether or not immigrants engage in homeland politics from abroad. However, scholarship emphasising the origin-
country in transnational politics tends to focus primarily on emigrant/diaspora engagement policies. This neglects to account for the influence of other origin-country factors, such as the origin-country’s regime type and its degree of internal stability. As such, the literature on diaspora engagement and origin-country effects has largely neglected to investigate the ways in which factors other than diaspora outreach policies affect immigrant proclivities to engage in TPA.

2.3 Transnational approach

Transnational contexts reflect the third approach used to theorise immigrant TPA. Studies emphasising the increasing importance of transnational political contexts show how immigrant and diaspora mobilisation can be facilitated by supranational institutions, which effectively create an ‘internationalized’ political opportunity structure for TPA (Eccarius-Kelly 2008; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Tarrow 2005; Tsutsui and Shin 2008). However, the supranational and legal regime focus of much of this scholarship undertheories the ways in which nation-states continue to influence and shape transnational political contexts. Thus, in many cases there is an interplay and iterative dynamic between international and national contexts that can ultimately shape the strategies employed in TPA. Despite the recognition that nationally-oriented factors can influence transnational spaces as in the case of foreign policy agendas (see Koinova 2013), much of the literature on transnational mobilisation undertheories the continued significant of nation-state centred conditions. More specifically, research on TPA emphasising transnational political contexts neglects to account for how bi-lateral origin and receiving state relations, as well as foreign policy and geopolitical conditions and conflicts, may generate opportunities or constraints for immigrant TPA. This results in an underappreciation of the extent to which relations between nation-states continue to inform and shape the transnational spaces occupied by supranational institutions and international legal regimes. In sum, despite widespread recognition of the ways in which immigrant transnational politics are shaped by receiving, origin and transnational contexts, studies employing one of these three approaches are largely isolated from one another.

3 Three types of immigrant TPA

Rather than focusing exclusively on immigrants’ engagement with homeland electoral politics or hometown associations, we contend that immigrant TPA reflects a continuum of political activities that vary in their degree of institutionalization. As a result, we can identify three main categories of TPA, namely: electoral, organisational, and non-institutional. Electoral TPA refers to immigrants’ participation in origin-country electoral politics, including voting, campaigning, fundraising, and mobilizing for or against origin-country parties or candidates. Organisational TPA refers primarily to immigrant and diaspora civil society organisations (Chaudhary and Guarnizo 2016; Godin et al. 2015; Lacroix 2009; Portes and Fernandez-Kelly 2015). Organisational TPA includes a number of different types of civic structures, including ethnic associations, registered charities, religious organisations, hometown associations, and advocacy and interest groups. The activities of transnational organisations vis-à-vis the origin country are important forms of political action because through them migrants engage with local and regional authorities in order to implement poverty relief, social service programmes, and development projects (Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008; Smith 2005; Williams 2011). While the stated aims and objectives of these organisations may not necessarily be explicitly political, their actions and impact on communities in places of origin nonetheless have political implications.

Our third and least studied category of TPA concerns non-institutional transnational political action such as protests, petitions, and covert forms of collective action, such as mobilizing to channel resources to origin-country insurgents (Anderson 1998; Hockenos 2003). Existing studies tend to focus
on diaspora organisations and lobbies in the US and Europe or on immigrant protest movements aimed at the receiving country (e.g. Klandermans et al. 2008; Voss and Bloemraad 2011). Though these are important forms of non-electoral political action, the neglect of immigrants’ transnational non-institutional TPA as in protest movements aimed at the origin-country is a curious oversight. Therefore, in addition to electoral politics and organisational TPA, we argue for the importance of attending to non-institutional collective action as a third category of TPA where immigrant and diaspora groups seek to affect social and political change in their places of origin. Our typology of immigrant TPA is presented below in Table 1. We now turn to our conceptualisation of the triadic POS approach and proceed to describe how electoral, organisational and non-institutional TPA are embedded and shaped by receiving, origin and transnational political opportunity structures.

Table 1. Three forms of immigrant TPA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TPA type</th>
<th>Examples of activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral</td>
<td>Voting, campaigning, campaign fundraising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational</td>
<td>Advocacy groups, ethnic associations, charities, hometown associations, ruling party/opposition organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-institutional</td>
<td>Protests, demonstrations, boycotts, petitions, covert actions, armed conflict, revolution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 A triadic political opportunity structure approach to TPA

In order to theorise the multi-layered embeddedness and diverse strategies of immigrant TPA, we draw on the concept of political opportunity structure from the scholarship on social movements and collective action (McAdam et al. 1996b; Meyer 2004; Tarrow and Tollefson 1994; Tilly 1995, 1978). The research lexicon on social movements draws on a set of theoretical concepts that have been formulated, tested and revised to explain the emergence and processes of collective action over the past four decades. This literature offers a level of analytic rigor and theoretical sophistication that can help better elucidate observations and processes within the field of international migration (Sökefeld 2006; Vertovec 1999). While social movement scholarship attends to how various factors shape mobilisation dynamics, including but not limited to resources, discursive framing processes, culture, and networks, (see McAdam et al. 1996b), one of the most significant contributions of social movement theory has been its formulation of how political contexts shape the timing, character, and outcomes of collective action.

Within social movement scholarship, theorization of movements’ political contexts (i.e. political opportunity structure) remains a dominant approach to understanding mobilisation because this perspective draws attention to the external, structural conditions impacting collective action, as well as to the ways in which movements’ opponents respond to protest (McAdam et al. 1996b; McAdam 2010; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Tilly 1998; Tilly and Tarrow 2015). Because social movements do not operate in circumstances of their choosing, this perspective draws analytical attention to the following factors: 1) the openness or closedness of the institutionalised political system; 2) the stability of elite alignments that undergird a polity; 3) the presence of elite allies; and 4) the state’s capacity and propensity for repression (see McAdam et al. 1996a; Meyer 2004). These factors, both separately and together, provide a framework for understanding the facilitative and constraining conditions for political mobilisation and collective action in a given polity. However, in order to analyse and understand the
contextual circumstances and political environments in which immigrant TPA is embedded, we re-conceptualise the key dimensions of each of the three POSs relevant for TPA (i.e. receiving, origin and transnational) going beyond the traditional conceptualisation of POS in the social movement literature. The different components within each of the political opportunity structures in our triadic POS approach are presented in Table 2 and further elaborated on below.

Table 2. Key dimensions of triadic political opportunity structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political opportunity structures</th>
<th>Political contexts/policies/relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Receiving-country POS</strong></td>
<td>Immigrant integration policies (residency, citizenship)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access to receiving-country local/national politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Co-development policies/initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Origin-country POS</strong></td>
<td>Governing authority type (autocracy/democracy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relative stability (conflict, post-conflict, economic/political crises, natural disasters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diaspora engagement policies (dual-citizenship external voting rights)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transnational POS</strong></td>
<td>Supranational organisations/institutions (UN, ICC, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International legal regimes (human rights law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Origin and receiving country bi-lateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign policy, geopolitical relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1 Receiving-country POS

The POS in immigrants’ receiving-countries refers to the overall level of openness or restrictiveness of the political system in immigrants’ places of settlement. The POS in receiving countries is largely determined by the degree of openness of the political system and the institutional and policy environment associated with immigrant integration. The immigrant integration apparatus of a receiving-country POS refers to local and national policies related to residency, citizenship, access to labour markets, and the extent to which immigrants can participate in the local and/or national politics of the receiving society (Chaudhary 2016; Koopmans 2005; Koopmans and Statham 2003; Morales and Giugni 2011; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). Researchers investigating the political participation of immigrant and ethnic minorities often emphasise the relative inclusivity or restrictiveness of the receiving societies’ POS in explaining variation in voter turnout or civic engagement across multiple immigrant destinations (see Chaudhary 2016; Morales and Giugni 2011).

In the context of the European Union, the receiving-country POS can also be shaped by the presence of ‘co-development’ policies. The notion of co-development emerged in response to resurgence of migration and development discourses that largely assumed migrants represented transnational agents of development (de Haas 2010, 2007) and that development efforts in migrant origin countries would eventually reduce emigration to Europe. More recently, co-development policies in European receiving countries emphasise the inter-connectivity between migration, development and integration creating both symbolic and material support for immigrant organisations that may pursue a variety of goals oriented towards their countries of origin (Godin et al. 2015; Portes 2015). We contend that the level of openness of the receiving society’s political system coupled with inclusive immigrant
integration policies such as ‘co-development’ are key dimensions of the receiving-country POS that can explain both variation in and strategies of immigrant TPA.

4.2 Origin-country POS

With few exceptions, much of the existing literature on immigrant TPA focuses on the cross-border politics of a single immigrant group residing in a single receiving society. As a result, the effects of the origin-country POS are under theorised due to the lack of empirical studies analysing contextual variation across two or more origin countries. Thus, the vast literature on the TPA of Mexicans and Dominicans in the US or Turks in Europe conceals the effect of the origin POS as a result of the lack of variation across origin countries (Guarnizo 2003; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008; Levitt 2001; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001; Waldinger and Soehl 2013). When researchers do investigate the role of origin countries, their efforts are largely restricted to the presence or lack thereof diaspora engagement policies such as external voting rights or the tolerance of dual-citizenship (Collyer 2014; Gamlen 2008; Lafleur 2013). In doing so, they neglect the importance of other factors such as the authority type of governance or the relative internal stability within the origin country. Therefore, our conceptualisation of the origin-country POS emphasises the importance of accounting for three different dimensions: 1) authority type of governance, 2) internal stability, and 3) diaspora policies.

The type of governing authority is likely to affect the level and types of political activities immigrants engage in from afar. While democratic and autocratic regimes are ideal types that are fluid in reality and subject to change, they denote important differences between immigrants’ relative opportunities or lack thereof for transnational political engagement. Immigrants from authoritarian origin states where protest and dissent are prohibited may take advantage of liberal host-country conditions to protest and lobby against their opponents at home in accordance with newfound rights and liberties, for example. On the other hand, immigrants may also be deterred from speaking out against authoritarian origin-country regimes from abroad when those regimes are able and willing to impose costs, directly or indirectly, on dissidents abroad. Autocratic regimes may also require that their citizens abroad maintain their loyalties in a number of ways and facilitate pro-regime mobilisation through corporatist structures like regime-sponsored associations and electoral politics (Brand 2014, 2010). But because the effects of origin-country regimes on immigrant mobilisation have been ignored to date with few exceptions (Brand 2006; Miller 1981; Moss 2016; Pedraza 2007), the study of the origin country’s regime type on immigrant TPA warrants further attention.

A second dimension of the origin-country POS likely to impact immigrant TPA concerns the relative internal stability of the country in question. We use the term stability in a broad sense to contrast with different forms of instability associated with foreign occupation and armed conflict, civil war, economic crises, acute natural disasters, and those countries lacking formal national-level governments as in the case of so-called ‘failed states’. Such crises are likely to increase impetuses for mobilisation and shape the specific types of mobilisations that immigrants engage in as is documented in cases where TPA is linked to current or historical conflicts. In such cases, TPA can be used to build peace or to exacerbate conflicts (Ambrosio 2002; Al-Ali and Kosser 2002; Brun and Van Hear 2012; DeWind and Segura 2014; Fair 2005; Haney and Vanderbush 1999; Van Hear 2005). However, the overemphasis on diaspora politics and conflict states limits the generalizability of this research to other forms of TPA in which origin countries are relatively stable. By theorising the relative stability of the origin country as

---

2 A handful of studies do examine the transnational politics of more than one group. However, much of this research focuses on receiving and transnational contexts rather than contextual conditions in origin countries (Adamson 2012; Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008; Koinova 2011; Lyons and Mandavalle 2008)
a central feature of the POS, our approach enables researchers to differentiate how TPA varies across different origin-country contexts.

Lastly, a third dimension of the origin-country POS that matters in shaping immigrant TPA centres on origin-country policies designed to recognise and integrate emigrants and diaspora communities living abroad. While there is historical evidence of origin-country governments reaching out to their emigrants living abroad (see Waldinger 2015), previously held perceptions of emigrants deserting the homeland have been replaced with widespread celebratory recognition of the cultivation of long-distance ties between origin states and diaspora communities abroad (Haas 2007; Gamlen 2008). Origin states engage in diaspora building policies for the purposes of attracting and maintaining financial remittances flows and furthering origin country interests through the diaspora in receiving societies (de Haas 2007). These can include dual-citizenship policies, external voting from abroad and more recently transnational social protection programmes (Bauböck 2003; Brand 2006; Collyer 2014; Lafleur 2013).

4.3 Transnational POS

The third dimension of our triadic POS approach centres on the political opportunity structure embedded in what could be conceptualised as a transnational space (Faist 2000). Here immigrant TPA is influenced and shaped by supranational institutions like the United Nations and the European Union, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and international legal regimes dedicated to regulating human rights. Much of this scholarship highlights the declining significance of the nation-state and how supranational structures can provide transnational political opportunities for immigrants, refugees and diaspora groups to mobilise around issues tied to either their host or homeland societies (Kastoryano and Schader 2014; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Soysal 1994; Tarrow 2005). For example, research on stateless diaspora groups such as the Kurds show how both the POS in immigrants’ host countries and non-state institutional policies of the UN, UNHCR and an assortment of NGOs create a transnational political opportunity structure enabling the political mobilisation of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, 2001). Similarly, social movements, including those organised by immigrants and refugees, draw upon international law and human rights principles, as well as the resources provided by INGOs, to advocate for recognition and human rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Koinova 2010).

The rise of the transnational POS and the declining emphasis on nation-states in relation to immigrant transnationalism as reflected in critiques of ‘methodological nationalism’ within migration studies (see Schiller et al. 1992; Soysal 1998; Wimmer and Schiller 2003), shifts researchers’ collective analytic gaze away from factors intrinsically tied to nation-states such as foreign policy and bi-lateral relations. Curiously, these elements of the transnational POS are virtually non-existent in contemporary immigrant transnationalism literature (for exceptions see Adamson and Demetriou 2007; Koinova 2013; Pedraza 2007). As a result, researchers have generally overlooked how foreign policy, geopolitics and bi-lateral relations between nation-states affect the transnational political activities of immigrants and diaspora groups.

We contend that these state-centric factors continue to shape the transnational POS in conjunction with supranational organisations and institutions. Therefore, scholarly emphasis on transnational political opportunities provided by supranational institutions and INGOs risks under theorising the continuing significance of nation-states in shaping the agendas and policies of non-state institutional actors. In our conceptualisation of the transnational POS we argue that while immigrant TPA can be influenced and shaped by supranational entities, it can also be impacted by the continued transnational presence of the nation-state vis-à-vis wars, foreign policies and hostile bilateral state
relations between immigrant receiving and origin countries. We propose a re-conceptualisation of transnational POS that includes these factors. Figure A depicts our triadic approach.

Figure A. Triadic POS and immigrant TPA

5 Applying the triadic POS approach to immigrant TPA

Our proposed triadic POS approach to immigrant TPA offers theoretical and empirical insights into the mechanisms driving variation in immigrants’ cross-border electoral, organisational and non-institutional political activities, as we detail below. To further link our proposed triadic POS approach to analyses of immigrant TPA, we rely on two sources of data. First, we draw on each of the authors’ own original qualitative research that was compiled independently at different points over the past five years. Second, we draw on previously published research on immigrant TPA to demonstrate how our proposed triadic POS approach reveals the ways in which multi-layered political contexts shape immigrants’ political activities in relation to their places of origin.

6 How the receiving POS affects immigrant TPA

6.1 Receiving POS and electoral TPA

The overall level of inclusiveness or restrictiveness of the receiving country’s POS determines both the level and types of TPA immigrants engage in. We now examine how the receiving POS specifically impacts each of the three types of TPA described above. With respect to electoral TPA, the extent to which a receiving country tolerates dual-citizenship affects whether immigrants are eligible to vote in the origin country. The vast majority of immigrant receiving countries in Europe and North America do permit dual-citizenship, thus minimising this potential constraint to electoral TPA. In addition,

---

3 The original research used here comes from independent doctoral research carried out by Ali R. Chaudhary (2015) in the Department of Sociology at the University of California, Davis and by Dana M. Moss (2016) in the Department of Sociology at the University of California, Irvine. Chaudhary’s (2015) doctoral research examined how Pakistani immigrants in London, Toronto and New York City engage in organisational TPA. Moss’s (2016) doctoral research examined how Syrian, Yemeni and Libyans in the US and US mobilise to engage in non-institutional TPA.
eligibility for participating in receiving-country politics also affects immigrants’ proclivities to engage in electoral TPA. In a cross-national analysis of homeland-oriented electoral politics, Chaudhary (2016) finds that immigrants residing in receiving countries with inclusive integration policies are less likely to participate in homeland politics whereas immigrants in countries with restrictive integration policies are more likely to engage in electoral TPA. Concomitantly, immigrants lacking access to receiving-country electoral politics are twice as likely to engage in homeland politics (Chaudhary 2016). Similarly, Levitt (2001) finds a complementarity between Dominican migrants’ political participation in US electoral politics and politics in the Dominican Republic. Hence, the extent to which immigrants engage in electoral TPA is influenced by the POS they encounter in the receiving society in conjunction with the transnational and origin POS.

6.2 Receiving POS and organisational TPA

With respect to organisational TPA, previous research shows that the receiving society POS shapes the size, composition and geographic scope of action of immigrant organisations (Godin et al. 2015; Lacroix 2013; Portes and Fernandez-Kelly 2015; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008). For instance, in an analysis of Pakistani immigrant organisations in Canada and the US, Chaudhary and Guarnizo (2016) find that the laissez-faire approach of the US government towards immigrant communities is associated with a greater number of transnational organisations in NYC compared to the more inclusive multiculturalism context of Canadian society. Similarly, Koopmans (2005) finds that immigrants residing in European countries with official multiculturalism policies are less likely to engage with their countries of origin than immigrants in restrictive receiving countries.

Receiving societies further impact organisational TPA by the extent to which they endorse or maintain historical or contemporary commitments to development in immigrant-origin countries. In contrast to the US, where development aid projects are coordinated and managed by a government agency (USAID), several European countries promote policies and practices of ‘co-development’ (de Haas 2010; Faist 2008; Portes 2015). This entails an institutional apparatus of policies and programmes seeking to mobilise immigrant and diaspora communities in receiving societies for the purpose of facilitating development through voluntary return migration and institutional capacity building in their places of origin as well as integration into the receiving society (Godin et al. 2015; Lacroix 2009). The presence of co-development programmes is associated with a degree of symbolic and material support for immigrant transnational organisations (Portes 2015).

A similar symbolic and material support is found in the case of immigrant transnational organisations based in former colonial empires that engage with former colonies such as in the case of Pakistani organisations based in Britain or Congolese organisations based in Belgium (Chaudhary 2015; Godin et al. 2015). In a comparative analysis of Pakistani immigrant organisations in Canada, Britain and the US, Chaudhary (2015) finds postcolonial tinged co-development discourses in relation to Pakistan to be far more prevalent in London than in Toronto or New York City. Accordingly, the institutional environment within London offers more material and symbolic support for transnational organisations focusing on development and social service delivery in Pakistan compared to New York City or Toronto – illustrated in the large London-based transnationally-oriented organisational infrastructure (Chaudhary 2015). Similarly, Godin et al. (2015) find that co-development discourses and colonial linkages between Belgium and the Democratic Republic of Congo explain why Congolese organisations in Belgium tend to opt for co-development oriented funding and co-development programmes to support their actions back home whereas in contrast, Moroccan organisations choose other funding streams that are more embedded into local politics.
While development projects and many transnational organisations are often considered a-political by their sponsors, a growing body of literature argues that transnational immigrant organisations, such as hometown associations, can challenge or support existing local and national political governance in their countries of origin (Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008; Williams 2011). For instance, Agarwala (2015) describes how organisations representing Christian, Sikh and Muslim Indians in the US often engage in advocacy to address the problems facing religious minorities in India and growing inequality. Similarly, Pakistani immigrant organisations in London, New York and Toronto indirectly challenge the Pakistani state by funding and facilitating development-oriented projects in regions of Pakistan that are largely neglected by the Pakistani government (Chaudhary 2015). Regardless of whether immigrant transnational organisations are overtly political or a-political, their activities can influence politics in the origin country.

6.3 Receiving POS and non-institutional TPA

The receiving country shapes the propensities and capacities for immigrants to engage transnational political protest and other forms of non-institutional collective action in important ways. First, the degree of authoritarianism or democracy in the receiving country determines the baseline ‘opportunity structure’ for whether or not immigrants are free to lodge claims and make demands critical of authority structures and policies at home. After emigrating from illiberal states to democracies, for example, immigrants and their descendants often gain newfound rights and civil liberties to participate in what Meyer and Tarrow (1998) dub the ‘social movement society’. In so doing, they can initiate peaceful protests, circulate petitions, and form social movements to contest authorities in the sending country. They also work collectively to challenge receiving-country policies and practices that pertain to their home-countries or homelands, such as US policy on Israel or Iran. Countries that are authoritarian and intolerant of protest preclude these opportunities, and are likely to crack down on immigrant protest especially harshly. In Gulf monarchies, for example, collective action by migrants is particularly risky because these populations are treated as expendable and expellable (Brand 2006). As such, extra-institutional dissent is heavily discouraged and likely to be extremely rare or covert as a result.

7 How the origin-country POS affects immigrant TPA

7.1 Origin POS and electoral TPA

The origin society’s authority type of governance, level of internal stability, and diaspora policies reflect key factors which influence the extent to which immigrants engage in the electoral politics of their countries of origin. First and foremost, the authority type of governance in the origin country has a strong effect on whether immigrants participate in homeland electoral politics. In an analysis of electoral TPA for 13 immigrant groups, Chaudhary (2016) finds that among origin states granting external voting rights, immigrant groups from origin countries with autocratic regimes are associated with lower odds of transnational electoral participation when compared to immigrants from more democratic origin countries. Conversely, immigrants from vibrant democratic origin countries with competitive political parties and high rates of voter turnout may be more likely to engage in electoral

---

While elections are usually associated with democratic countries, autocratic governments often hold elections to give the appearance that their citizens have some agency in the political process, as in the case of Egypt during the era of Mubarak or Tunisia in the era of Ben Ali. Thus immigrants may participate in elections of an autocratic origin country regime to symbolically oppose the regime or to vote in support of the ruling party (see Brand 2014, 2010).
TPA because immigrants may be more likely to feel their votes could influence the outcome of an election.

At the same time, origin countries undergoing transitions from autocratic to democratic governance may experience high rates of electoral participation. For instance, after decades of autocratic rule and long periods of instability, the Dominican Republic began a process of democratisation that witnessed high rates of electoral TPA following the granting of dual-citizenship and external voting rights. Similarly, the 2013 Pakistani parliamentary elections signaled the first democratic transition of power (i.e. two consecutive democratic elections) in Pakistan’s 60-year history. This generated a great deal of electoral participation within Pakistan and an increase in immigrant transnational political activity such as fundraising and campaigning for political parties from abroad (Chaudhary 2015). Because Pakistan does not grant external voting rights to non-residents, Pakistani immigrants living abroad mobilised their organisations and social networks to create large fundraising rallies in support of a charismatic oppositional candidate named Imran Khan. So despite their illegibility to vote in the elections themselves, Pakistani immigrants engaged in electoral TPA by mobilising their resources behind their favoured opposition party.

A second important dimension of the origin POS is the overall level of internal social, political or economic stability. Stability or the lack thereof in the origin-country or territory can affect the extent to which immigrants are likely to engage in electoral TPA. Immigrants from countries with long histories of political instability, armed conflict, or high levels of corruption may be less likely to participate in homeland politics than immigrants hailing from relatively stable origin countries. For instance, Guarnizo and Chaudhary (2014) find that Colombian migrants in Europe are less likely than Dominicans to engage in the politics of their homelands. As home to one of the greatest numbers of internally displaced persons in the world, Colombia is plagued with political instability and high levels of suspicion and mistrust towards the government. Thus, the overall instability over the past few decades in Colombia explains why Colombians are much less likely than Dominicans to engage in the electoral politics of their homelands (Guarnizo and Chaudhary 2014; Guarnizo and Diaz 1999; Guarnizo et al. 1999).

Diaspora engagement policies are the third dimension of the origin POS influencing electoral TPA. Obviously, the single most important diaspora engagement policy is whether non-resident emigrants are granted the right to vote in origin country elections from abroad. How immigrants are permitted to vote also matters. External voting rights can be more restrictive when immigrants must retain the citizenship of the origin country and return to the origin country or to an embassy to cast their vote. Alternatively, external voting rights are facilitative of participation when they are flexible by extending the franchise to dual-citizens and allowing emigrants to cast their votes by mail or in some rare cases, electronically (Bauböck 2003; Collyer 2014; Lafleur 2013).

In addition, a number of origin countries relying on financial remittances from abroad enact symbolic diaspora engagement policies to maintain long-distance ties without granting immigrants tangible means of participation in origin country politics. For instance, Morocco and Pakistan have dedicated government offices designed to foster ties with their respective diasporas. However, these efforts are primarily symbolic inasmuch as neither government grants dual-citizenship or voting rights from abroad (Chaudhary 2015; de Haas 2005). In contrast, the Dominican Republic grants both dual-citizenship and external voting rights (Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008). The diaspora engagement policies of the Dominican Republic are widely recognised as some of the most inclusive and tangible efforts to integrate an emigrant population into the political community (Lafleur 2013; Levitt 2001).
7.2 Origin POS and organisational TPA

Variation across origin-country POSs also helps to explain why some immigrant groups develop robust transnational political organisational infrastructures. The authority type of the origin government explains some of the variation observed in the level of interaction between origin states and immigrant transnational organisations. Many relatively democratic origin states seek to recognise and collaborate with immigrant organisations. The often-cited Mexican government’s ‘Tres-Por-Unos’ programme seeks to cultivate and build partnerships with immigrant transnational organisations by matching immigrant investments in the homeland with local and federal government funding (Bada 2014; Fox and Bada 2008; Wise and Rámirez 2001). The programme has led to the creation of government agencies and offices to oversee the programme and further develop an official institutional infrastructure to engage with immigrant transnational organisations (Goldring 2002). Despite the development focus of the programme, recent studies highlight the ways in which both immigrants abroad and politicians in Mexico use the programme and the transnational organisations to influence local politics in Mexico (Williams 2011).

Authoritarian origin states also shape the dynamics of organisational TPA. On the one hand, immigrant transnational organisations sympathetic to the origin state may have high levels of direct interaction with the origin government. This has been observed in the case of China and Chinese immigrants who engage in organisational TPA by collaborating with state agencies and branches of the Communist Party to organise emigrant investments for a variety of projects in China (Zhou and Lee 2015). On the other hand, origin-country governments may also repress organisational TPA. Until very recently, the Moroccan government sought to repress and control Moroccan organisations operating in France whom they deemed critical of the Moroccan state (Lacroix 2015). Similarly, the Vietnamese government views first-generation Vietnamese organisations with suspicion because of the diaspora’s widespread opposition to the government in Hanoi (Huynh and Yiu 2015).

Stability in the country-of-origin also impacts organisational TPA. Large-scale natural disasters, economic or political crises, conflicts and civic unrest can result in instability which can motivate community leaders and elites to establish formal organisations. For instance, the devastating 2005 earthquake in Pakistan that killed 87,000 people and displaced 2.8 million resulted in a widespread mobilisation among the Pakistani diaspora to provide relief for the victims through charitable donations collected by Pakistani immigrant organisations in cities with large diaspora populations. The instability in regions affected by the earthquake mobilised many Pakistanis living abroad who worked to establish organisational infrastructures in Britain, Canada and the US for facilitating transnational engagement with Pakistan (Chaudhary 2015; Najam 2006). Some of the organisations that initially formed in response to the earthquake continued to focus on an assortment of different social and economic transnational activities for the purpose of promoting social change in Pakistan. Consequently, many of these organisations focused their organizational agency on political advocacy concerning the need for democratic elections in Pakistan as well as small-scale advocacy campaigns against Pakistan’s compliance in the US-led War on Terror (Chaudhary 2015).

In additional to natural disasters, organisational TPA may increase during periods of instability associated with armed conflict. For instance, during the civil war in El Salvador (1979–1992), migrant organisations served as the political opposition from abroad which enabled them to eventually be key players in the democratisation process following the end of the conflict when many exiles joined the newly formed government (Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008). Similarly, Syrian immigrants in Western countries formed transnational organisations during the 2011 revolution and war in Syria to oppose the policies and war crimes being committed by the Assad regime, marking an unprecedented surge in their associational life dedicated to oppositional politics (Moss forthcoming).
Finally, the level and types of diaspora engagement policies implemented by the origin state also affect organisational TPA. The Mexican government’s efforts to collaborate and engage with Mexican transnational organisations abroad, for example, reflects tangible diaspora engagement that seeks to recognise and integrate immigrant organisations. In contrast, many origin governments choose to only symbolically recognise their emigrants. This has been documented in the case of the Indian government, which only recently initiated diaspora engagement policies seeking to attract remittances and investments from individuals abroad (Agarwala 2015; Naujoks 2013). Concomitantly, Chaudhary (2015) finds little interaction between Pakistani immigrant transnational organisations and the origin state vis-à-vis local Pakistani consulates. In this case, the absence of diaspora engagement with transnational organisations is largely a result of the widespread critical views of the Pakistani state within diaspora communities (Chaudhary 2015). In sum, these varied cases illustrate how organisational TPA can be emboldened or hindered by different dimensions of the origin-country POS. By going beyond classifications and enumerations of diaspora policies, researchers can better account for the ways in which authority regimes and levels of stability interact with state-sponsored diaspora policies to encourage or limit the influence of immigrant transnational organisations.

7.3 Origin POS and non-institutional TPA

Just as the character of the receiving state shapes immigrants’ opportunities to protest, origin-countries also affect immigrants’ non-institutional forms of mobilisation. Origin country regime violence and repression can produce transnational collective action by forcing dissidents to emigrate and resettle abroad. As we discuss above, resettlement in refuge-granting countries grants émigrés opportunities to continue their anti-regime activism and to mobilise collectively against origin countries. In response, however, non-democratic authorities also take measures to monitor and control oppositional mobilisation across borders. States that are intolerant of protest at home are likely to be equally as intolerant of protest by their nationals abroad for ideological and strategic reasons; they also cannot rely on democratic receiving countries to repress immigrant activism on their behalves (Brand 2006). Because such authorities are likely to view immigrants’ anti-regime “voice” after “exit” as a threat (Hirschman 1978; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001), immigrants with ties to highly repressive states are often subjected to measures by origin regimes aimed at controlling and silencing dissent.

Moss (forthcoming) demonstrates, authoritarian sending-states may deter protest and oppositional mobilisation among their immigrant communities in a number of ways. They do so by deploying agents and loyalists to surveil the diaspora; by harassing, threatening, and exiling activists in person and online; by punishing dissidents’ family members or colleagues in the origin-country; and by using direct violent retribution in rare cases (see also Brand 2006; Miller 1981; Østergaard-Neilsen 2001). These forms of what Moss (forthcoming) calls ‘transnational repression’ deter and constrain protest abroad by signaling to the wider immigrant community that public protest is traitorous and can incur corresponding costs. At the same time, immigrants who reside in exile are less likely to be deterred from engaging in protest than non-exiled immigrants. For instance, Moss (2016) finds that before the Arab Spring revolutions, some first- and second-generation exiles from Syria and Libya launched periodic protests condemning origin-country regimes. Yet, fears of transnational repression deterred the wider anti-regime community from participating in public demonstrations and made associating with exile movements dangerous for ordinary and temporary migrants. So while the effects of transnational repression are likely to vary by the regime’s degree of autocracy and its capacities to surveil and enforce costs among its diaspora, immigrants who wish to retain access to the origin-country are therefore likely to avoid voicing their dissent. As such, origin-country regimes can curtail political opportunities for protest provided by the host-country context.
In addition to deterring mobilisation, authoritarian sending states can also incite pro-regime mobilisation abroad through both carrot and stick approaches. For example, Syrian and Libyan officials contacted students studying abroad in the US and Britain and demanded that they protest on the regime’s behalf before and during the Arab Spring revolutions, threatening to rescind migrants’ state-sponsored scholarships if they did not comply (Moss 2016). While pro-regime protests are likely to include those who have vested interests in, or ideologically-based loyalties to, origin-country regimes, public displays of support for dictators are not necessarily the product of immigrants’ political agency. Rather than assuming that immigrants’ pro-regime protests are the product of loyalty – or that the absence of anti-regime protests is a consequence of apathy – scholars should consider how the dynamics of protest are shaped by systems of control and coercion that reach across borders to immigrant populations.

Levels of stability/instability also shape non-institutional TPA. The eruption of conflict in the origin-country can propel immigrants’ TPA in the form of lawful protests and more-or-less legal covert support for insurgencies. Conflicts that threaten the wellbeing of immigrants’ home-countries, towns, families, and ethnic and religious groups are likely to motivate their mobilisation, as in the case of Tamil and Eritrean immigrants who have worked collectively to channel resources to origin-country insurgents during prolonged civil wars (Brun and Van Hear 2012; Lyons 2007), and members of the Syrian diaspora who sponsor rebel and extremist groups from afar in the ongoing civil war (Moss 2016). Immigrants also mobilise extra-institutionally in response to natural disasters, as in the recent cases of Haitian, Nepalese, and Filipino immigrants who have channeled emergency remittances to the origin-country and held vigils and demonstrations. Furthermore, conflicts in the origin-country also mobilise immigrants according to salient sub-national identities, including region, religion, and ethnicity. For example, in 2007, southern Yemeni immigrants in Britain mobilised to support separatist movements back home. Moss (2016) finds that activists across concentrated UK communities of southern Yemenis, such as Birmingham and Sheffield, staged large demonstrations during official visits by Yemeni government officials to London and routinely sponsored community events dedicated to bolstering a distinctly pro-secessionist political identity and message. However, this has produced tensions with other members of the Yemeni diaspora, particularly during the 2011 Yemeni revolution when pro-unity and pro-secessionist Yemenis were united in their anti-regime stance but clashed over the issue of southern independence. As such, sectarian conflicts stoked by regime discrimination and repression in the origin-country are likely to produce corresponding divides and mobilisation efforts within national immigrant groups. In sum, non-institutional forms of TPA including protests and other types of contentious collective action are clearly embedded and influenced by the origin-country POS. By recognising the way in which authority regime types, internal stability and diaspora engagement politics facilitate or repress TPA, our triadic POS approach highlights how origin states have a powerful effect on TPA.

8 How the transnational POS affects TPA

8.1 Transnational POS and electoral TPA

The final dimension of the triadic approach concerns the transnational POS. When compared to other forms of TPA such as organisational or non-institutional, electoral TPA is the least affected by the transnational POS because homeland-oriented electoral politics are primarily determined by the policies of the origin state. The one area where the transnational POS influences electoral TPA is in the expansion of extra-territorial citizenship over the past three decades (Bauböck 2003). In response to the euphoria in supranational institutions (UNDP, World Bank, IOM) surrounding the development potential of migrant remittances, origin countries have been encouraged to enact diaspora engagement such as dual-citizenship and external voting rights to help facilitate remittances from emigrants living
abroad (Guarnizo 2003). Thus, origin-states may do so by extending voting rights to the diaspora, encouraging loyalty to the origin-country.

8.2 Transnational POS and organisational TPA

Organisational TPA can be influenced by various elements within the transnational POS. Numerous studies on global civil society document the ways in which supranational institutions provide opportunities and platforms for civil society organisations to mobilise and advocate on a number of global issues such as poverty relief, women’s rights, children, and the environment (Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Soysal 2000). With respect to immigrant and diaspora politics, the transnational POS offers groups specific opportunities to mobilise around issues of human rights or against repressive origin country regimes by appealing to global legal regimes (Kastoryano and Schader 2014).

At the same time, state-centric factors such as foreign policy and bi-lateral relations also shape the transnational POS and can affect organisational TPA in several ways. For instance, over the past five decades, anti-Castro Cuban immigrant organisations and advocacy groups based in the US have benefited by being aligned with US foreign policy vis-à-vis Cuba (Haney and Vanderbush 1999; Pedraza 2007). Thus, organisational TPA in opposition of the Cuban government has been fostered and facilitated by a conducive transnational POS tied to the foreign policy and bi-lateral relations between the US and Cuba. This effectively generates a receptive and supportive transnational POS for anti-Castro organisational TPA in the US. Concomitantly, foreign policy and geopolitical relations within the transnational POS can also constrain immigrant organisational TPA. Pakistani immigrant transnational political organisations critical of the US ‘War on Terror’ covert drone anti-terrorism policy in Pakistan find little material or symbolic support in the transnational POS for organisational TPA because their advocacy is at odds with US foreign policy goals (Chaudhary 2015). Thus, Pakistani organisational TPA focused on stopping US drone attacks in Pakistan is constrained by the bi-lateral and geopolitical tensions in the transnational POS.

Pakistani immigrants’ organisational TPA is further constrained by a global organisational stigma which manifests itself in the transnational POS. Transnational Pakistani organisations in London, Toronto and New York City are subjected to multiple organisational stigmas that ultimately limit their abilities to fulfill their missions and serve their constituencies in Pakistan as a result of the administrative costs incurred from ensuring transparency and accountability to deflect organisational stigma (Chaudhary 2015). These stigmas derive from negative public opinion, co-ethnic mistrust and the ‘War on Terror’ global regulatory regime (Chaudhary 2015). As a result, the ‘War on Terror’ environment has fuelled a two-sided stigma against Pakistani organisations where both non-Pakistanis and co-ethnics are suspicious of organisations’ transnational activities (Chaudhary 2015). Counter-terrorism officials closely regulate Pakistani transnational organisations in order to ensure compliance with anti-terrorist financial policies and charity regulations. Chaudhary (2015) finds that this regulatory system and its corresponding pressures impact Pakistani transnational organisations the same way in NYC, London and Toronto, suggesting the external pressures are manifested in the transnational POS, which is, in turn, shaped by a global stigma against Pakistan and Pakistani transnational organisations. In sum, the global ‘War on Terror’ coupled with bi-lateral relations between Pakistan and Western countries reflect key dimensions of the transnational POS in which Pakistani transnational organisations are embedded and their TPA is constrained.
### 8.3 Transnational POS and non-institutional TPA

The transnational POS impacts non-institutional TPA in multiple ways. When relations between sending and receiving states are sour, political and media institutions often work to support and amplify immigrants’ oppositional activities. The US has long supported social movements hostile to its Cold War enemies Cuba and the USSR, for example, and vice versa. In addition to bolstering immigrant activism for propaganda purposes, these countries sometimes also provide refuge for members of armed groups and insurgents, as in the case of the US and Britain providing asylum for Syrian Muslim Brotherhood members and Libyan members of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya in years past (Moss 2016). On the other hand, when sending and receiving states have common interests, they may work in tandem to repress immigrant mobilisation. Brand (2006) and Miller (1981), for example, find that France and Morocco worked conjointly to repress protests by economic migrants due to shared interests in undermining organised labour. States may also work together to share technology and information to surveil migrants for the purposes of fighting common threats posed by suspected communists during the Cold War or accused Muslim extremists in the ‘War on Terror’.

In addition, geopolitics pertaining to the rise of the human rights regime also shape immigrant protest. Immigrants, like other minority groups, are likely to protest to gain international recognition when they cannot lodge their claims directly against states, either in the home- or the host-country (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tsutsui and Shin 2008). As such, their calls for recognition and intervention target institutions such as the UN and the International Criminal Court, and their protests often take place on the steps of these institutions. Bernal (2004) mentions, for example, that in 2000, Eritreans amassed at the UN to protest its inaction and lack of recognition, and in 2015, Yemenis in New York gathered regularly to demonstrate their opposition to the civil war in Yemen and the Saudi-led military intervention in their origin-country. Acknowledging the importance of domestic and international recognition for their grievances leads immigrants to ‘name and shame’ national and multi-national institutions and assert their identities – particularly for those groups that lack a state, such as Kurds, Tibetans, and Palestinians, through protests, petitions, and other extra-institutional collective actions.

Recognising the power of states on the UN Security Council to intervene in origin-country conflicts, immigrants also mobilise in capital cities such as London and Washington, D.C. to protest their receiving country governments’ actions or inactions in their home-countries. The reception of foreign leaders in these host-countries can also give rise to protests by otherwise invisible national communities. Visits by heads-of-state to the US and the UK to meet with authorities or deliver speeches at the UN draw protests by aggrieved immigrants and exiles – as in the case of Congolese immigrants protesting Rwandan President Paul Kigame’s visit to the US in 2011, and Ukrainians’ protests against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s appearance at the UN in 2015. While these events remain understudied, we suspect that such protests are a routine feature of the social movement society (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). For all of these reasons, analysing immigrants’ positionality (Koinova 2012) in relation to both the sending and receiving states and their embeddedness in broader geopolitical conflicts is essential for understanding how they mobilise on a non-institutional level.
9 Conclusion

Immigrants and diaspora group engagement in homeland-oriented political activities are simultaneously embedded and influenced by multiple political contexts (Levitt and Schiller 2004). Our triadic POS approach to immigrant TPA contends that researchers must recognise and actively analyse the ways in which various forms of homeland-oriented transnational political activities are embedded in receiving, origin and transnational political opportunity structures. Our use of the political opportunity structure concept from social movement scholarship is intended to emphasise how immigrant TPA is influenced and shaped by a number of external political contexts.

Rather than using the POS concept as it is generally employed in the study of social movements, our triadic POS approach for immigrant TPA highlights some of the key dimensions necessary to account for in receiving, origin and transnational POSs. We describe how immigrant integration policies and institutional infrastructures including co-development policies constitute key components of the receiving-society POS which, in turn, can facilitate or hinder immigrant TPA. Our conceptualisation of the origin-country POS emphasises the importance of accounting for the ways in which authority types of governance, internal stability and the presence or lack of diaspora engagement policies can lead to increased or minimal mobilisation for TPA. Finally, our discussion of the transnational POS moves beyond emphases of supranational institutions and human rights by elucidating how the ongoing significance of nation-states in the realms of foreign policy and bi-lateral relations can indirectly affect immigrants’ TPA.

By emphasising the embeddedness of TPA in multiple POSs, we offer a more nuanced way to analyse and explain variation in both the levels and types of political activities immigrants engage in vis-à-vis homeland politics. Thus, our approach is especially useful for comparative research on immigrant TPA that examines variation across receiving and origin contexts. This approach can also be used to examine how both POSs and strategies of TPA can change over time. Rather than focusing on the absolute numbers and proportion of immigrants who engage in transnational political engagement (see Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004; Waldinger 2015), our approach offers an explanatory framework for understanding why particular immigrant groups engage in particular forms of TPA while others do not. An analytic focus on receiving-society political opportunity structures such as integration or the presence of post-colonial linkages or co-development policies offers explanations for why TPA may vary across groups, places and time (Chaudhary 2015; Godin et al. 2015; Koopmans and Statham 2003).

Our conceptualisation of the origin-country POS further reveals how conditions of departure and origin-country contexts can have an equal or stronger effect on the degree to which immigrants engage in TPA. This emphasis on origin contexts is consistent with recent scholarship emphasising the effect of origin-countries in explaining variation in immigrants’ propensities to engage in both electoral and non-electoral transnational politics (Chaudhary 2016; Guarnizo and Chaudhary 2014). Additionally, our conceptualisation of the transnational POS moves beyond notions of the declining significance of nation-states and rise of supranational organisations (Soysal 2000; Soysal 1998). Consistent with recent scholarship highlighting the centrality of states in diaspora politics (Adamson 2005; Adamson and Demetriou 2007; Koinova 2011, 2012), we demonstrate how nation-states continue to shape transnational political opportunity structures through foreign policy, conflicts and bi-lateral relations, which, in turn, can directly affect immigrant mobilisation for TPA. By doing so, we highlight the importance of accounting for the ways in which state-centric factors such as foreign policy agendas such as in the case of the US-led ‘War on Terror’ can negatively affect some immigrants’ abilities to engage in TPA. More research is needed to better understand the different ways in which geopolitical and foreign policy contexts affect immigrant TPA, particularly in the current War on Terror.
environment and in light of the resurgence of Cold War-era tensions between the US and Russia following the 2013 Russian annexation of Crimea from Ukraine.

Finally, we offer a re-conceptualisation of immigrant TPA that recognises that immigrants’ transnational politics may take the form of electoral politics, organisational agency as well as non-institutional collective action. It is important to note that these three forms of TPA are not mutually exclusive. An immigrant group may choose to mobilise in order to increase voter turnout for origin-country elections, or motivate large numbers of volunteers to help foster transnational advocacy organisations or participate in protests or demonstrations against origin-country regimes. The point is to recognise that TPA can take on a variety of strategies and levels of institutionalization. By acknowledging the robust yet fluid nature of political action, scholars of immigrant TPA may be better able to synthesise disparate studies on particular forms of homeland-oriented politics and generate dialogues between the subfields working on immigrant electoral politics, organisations, diaspora mobilisation, and immigrant protest movements.

9.1 Limitations
As with any conceptual paper, our triadic POS approach is not without limitations. First and foremost, the cases we have used to highlight the ways in which different types of TPA are embedded in various POSs do not necessarily enable us to illustrate simultaneity. In each case, we emphasise the importance of one POS over the other. Our intent is to show how, why or when the receiving, origin or transnational POS matter. That is, we explicate how different forms of TPA are affected and shaped by particular factors embedded in the triadic POS. Our hope is for researchers to be more aware and sensitive to the ways in which TPA is embedded in the triadic POS so that they can investigate and reveal how simultaneity operates at different levels. Thus, our conceptual approach should be considered an analytic toolbox from which researchers can interpret empirical findings with a focus on the simultaneous embeddedness of TPA.

Another limitation of our approach is our under theorising of the temporal dimensions of TPA. While we are aware that the triadic POS certainly evolves and changes over time, we do not provide empirical cases to highlight how strategies for TPA may change over time in response to fluid POSs that may also change. We leave this for future researchers in the sense that the triadic POS approach presented here can specifically help explain how and why TPA may change over time. Finally, our approach treats immigrant and diaspora groups in a somewhat static way in that we do not emphasise the heterogeneity within immigrant communities. In any given case, there will be a degree of variability in the political leaning of a single community. Thus, future research should pay special attention to tensions and rifts within a single community in order to understand why some members may opt for a particular form or TPA while other refrain from politics. Yet despite these shortcomings, the triadic POS approach and our conceptualisation of TPA represent a theoretical starting point for researchers to better understand the embedded nature of TPA. Ultimately, our aim is to further develop these ideas with empirical data so that we can work towards a predictive model of TPA that can explain why and when immigrants may opt for a particular type of TPA.

9.2 Directions for future research
The triadic POS approach presented here has several implications for future research on immigrant TPA. First and foremost, there is a significant need for more comparative research that examines the transnational political activities of multiple immigrant groups in multiple receiving societies. Quantitative research such as the cross-national studies conducted by Koopmans (2005) as well as the LOCALMULTIDEM study highlighted in research by Morales and colleagues (Morales and Giugni
2011; Morales and Morariu 2011; Morales and Pilati 2014; Morales et al. 2015) are ideal examples where researchers can examine how contextual variation across receiving societies affect the political activities of multiple immigrant groups. Yet, these studies do not focus enough on transnational politics. Future research should adopt similar comparative designs that investigate how triadic POSs affect homeland-oriented electoral, organisational and non-institutional political activities of immigrants. This can be accomplished quantitatively by conducting individual-level surveys of several immigrant groups residing in several different localities or receiving countries. By maximizing the number of immigrant groups and places of settlement, researchers can analyse the effects of receiving POS policies as well as key dimensions of the origin POS on immigrant propensities and types of TPA through the use of multi-level modeling.

Future studies should also focus more specifically on organisational and non-institutional TPA. In general, there is dearth of scholarship on the motivations, determinants and experiences of immigrants involved with transnational political organisations or immigrants engaging in homeland-oriented contentious collective actions. Qualitative and quantitative research is needed to investigate the conditions under which some immigrant groups engage in electoral TPA while others gravitate towards organisational or non-institutional TPA. In particular, ethnographic research can help us better understand the fluidity and agency of immigrants vis-à-vis TPA. Why immigrants and diaspora groups choose a particular form of TPA at a particular time in a particular place will help reveal the fluidity and constant interaction between immigrant actors and the triadic POS. By doing so, qualitative research can reveal how and why the triadic political opportunity structures motivates or restricts individuals from engaging in electoral, organisational or non-institutional TPA. In sum, by recognising that the transnational electoral, organisational and non-institutional political activities of immigrants are simultaneously embedded in receiving, origin and transnational POSs, subsequent scholarship can better analyse and explain when, how and why immigrants engage in transnational political action across time and place.

5 LOCALMULTIDEM refers to a large study conducted by Morales et al. (2014) entitled ‘Multicultural Democracy and Immigrants’ Social Capital in Europe: Participation, Organisational Networks and Public Policies at the Local Level’. The original study consisted of several random sample individual surveys that were conducted with approximately 19 different immigrant groups in 11 cities across seven European destination countries.
10References


McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D. and Zald, M. N. (1996a) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D. and Zald, M. N. (1996b) “Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes—toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements.” *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, 1–20.


